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ABSTRACT 
 
This Article addresses whether strong artificial 
intelligent robots (“AI”) should receive real property 
rights. More than a resource, real property promotes self-
respect to natural persons such as human beings. Because 
of this distinction, this Article argues for limited real 
property rights for AIs. In developing this proposition, it 
examines three hypotheticals of a strong AI robot in 
various forms of real property ownership. 
The first hypothetical determines whether an AI could 
work as an agent in real property transactions. As robots 
currently act as agents in various capacities, the 
groundwork exists for an AI to enter this role. The second 
hypothetical considers whether an AI could own property 
in a manner similar to a corporation. In this instance, an 
AI would own the property in its name, but generate wealth 
for its shareholders and have oversight by natural persons. 
Corporations can acquire property as artificial persons, so 
too AIs could meet similar legal requirements. As such, the 
law should allow such ownership rights to AIs. The third 
hypothetical delves into whether an AI should own property 
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outright like a natural person. After describing potential 
reasons for this approach, this Article explains why legal 
and policy-based arguments weigh against this extension of 
property rights to AIs. Instead, any possibility of an AI 
owning property like a natural person should come from 
Congress, not the courts. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Imagine in the year 2040, Google announces a breakthrough in 
the field of artificial intelligence:1 the first autonomous artificial 
                                                                                                             
1 Artificial intelligence has been advancing faster than many scientists 
predicted. Most recently, Google’s computer program, AlphaGo, defeated a 
master of the complex game called “Go.” This victory of machine over man 
seemed impossible less than twenty years ago but now is happening. See George 
Johnson, To Beat Go Champion, Google’s Program Needed a Human Army, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/05/science/ 
google-alphago-artificial-intelligence.html (“‘It may be a hundred years before a 
computer beats humans at Go—maybe even longer,’ Dr. Piet Hut, an 
astrophysicist and Go enthusiast at the Institute for Advanced Study in 
Princeton, N.J., told me in 1997 . . . . That was the prevailing wisdom.”). Mr. 
Johnson commented in his 1997 article that: 
To play a decent game of Go, a computer must be endowed 
with the ability to recognize subtle, complex patterns and to 
draw on the kind of intuitive knowledge that is the hallmark of 
human intelligence . . . [and defeating a human Go champion] 
will be a sign that artificial intelligence is truly beginning to 
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intelligent robot is born.2 As a strong AI, this entity is not simply a 
tool used to achieve some other entity’s goals; rather, he possesses 
a mind of his own.3 The Certified Living Intelligent Valued 
                                                                                                             
become as good as the real thing. 
Id. Mr. Johnson realized that is not the case. Id. However, these technological 
leaps strengthen the argument that futuristic theories of artificial intelligence 
may arrive sooner than people could imagine. After all, defeating humans at 
complex board games is just the beginning for artificial intelligence. See Tom 
Simonite, How Google Plans to Solve Artificial Intelligence, MIT TECH. REV., 
Mar. 31, 2016, https://www.technologyreview.com/s/601139/how-google-plans-
to-solve-artificial-intelligence/. As the leader of the team of roughly 200 
computer scientists and neuroscientists at Google’s DeepMind, the London-
based group behind the AlphaGo software, Demis Hassabis explained that these 
games are early checkpoints aimed at “solving intelligence, and then using that 
to solve everything else.” Id. Strong artificial intelligent robots solve the 
question of how to expand intelligence to non-humans. 
2 Debate still exists over whether a strong AI robot could ever be created. 
John R. Searle, Minds, Brains and Programs, 3 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 349, 417–
57 (1980); Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Personhood for Artificial Intelligences, 
70 N.C. L. REV. 1231, 1236 (1992) (“John Searle questioned the relevance of 
Turing’s Test with another thought experiment, which has come to be known as 
the Chinese Room. Imagine that you are locked in a room. Into the room come 
batches of Chinese writing, but you don’t know any Chinese. You are, however, 
given a rule book, written in English, in which you can look up the bits of 
Chinese, by their shape. The rule book gives you a procedure for producing 
strings of Chinese characters that you send out of the room. Those outside the 
room are playing some version of Turing’s game. They are convinced that 
whatever is in the room understands Chinese. But you don’t know a word of 
Chinese, you are simply following a set of instructions (which we can call a 
program) based on the shape of Chinese symbols. Searle believes that this 
thought experiment demonstrates that neither you nor the instruction book (the 
program) understands Chinese, even though you and the program can simulate 
such understanding. More generally, Searle argues that thinking cannot be 
attributed to a computer on the basis of its running a program that manipulates 
symbols in a way that simulates human intelligence.”). DAVID COLE, The 
Chinese Room Argument, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 
(Edward N. Zalta ed., 2015), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/ 
win2015/entries/chinese-room/ (“[S]ince its appearance in 1980 the Chinese 
Room argument has sparked discussion across disciplines. Despite the extensive 
discussion there is still no consensus as to whether the argument is sound.”). 
However, this Article’s premise assumes the development of strong AI. 
3 Searle, supra note 2, at 417 (“According to weak AI, the principal value 
of the computer in the study of the mind is that it gives us a very powerful tool. 
For example, it enables us to formulate and test hypotheses in a more rigorous 
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Extraterrestrial (“Clive”) has the ability to think for himself.4 
Clive’s baseline intelligence replicates the cognitive states of a 
human’s mind, such as the ability to generate new knowledge. 
Although Clive’s existence raises a host of legal, ethical, and 
religious questions, this Article focuses on a narrow issue: the legal 
and policy-based implications of allowing Clive to own real 
property. 
Part I of this Article describes the moral theory of real property 
and explores important principles of real property ownership. After 
examining these principles, Part II provides three hypotheticals of 
a strong AI robot involving itself in real property ownership. In the 
first hypothetical, Clive is an agent for a principal, working to 
facilitate home ownership.5 In the second hypothetical, Clive owns 
the property in his name but with human oversight/guardianship.6 
In the third, Clive purchases the property outright.7 In addressing 
these hypotheticals, this Article suggests that courts should grant 
ownership rights to Clive similar to a corporation, but that 
extending property rights held by natural persons to Clive should 
be left to Congress. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
Property law in the United States currently allows both natural 
and artificial persons to own property.8 As a natural person, Bill 
                                                                                                             
and precise fashion. But according to strong AI, the computer is not merely a 
tool in the study of the mind; rather, the appropriately programmed computer 
really is a mind, in the sense that computers given the right programs can be 
literally said to understand and have other cognitive states. In strong AI, because 
the programmed computer has cognitive states, the programs are not mere tools 
that enable us to test psychological explanations; rather, the programs are 
themselves the explanations.”). 
4 For ease of reading, “Clive” will be referred to with male pronouns. 
However, Clive is an artificial intelligent entity without a gender. 
5 See infra Part II.A. 
6 See infra Part II.B. 
7 See infra Part II.C. 
8 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 1-2-1 (2016) (stating that there are two 
classes of persons, natural and artificial, and that corporations are artificial 
persons, whose rights are created by law). “Persons” have been defined as an 
entity that has legal rights and duties. See JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE 
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Gates can buy a home in Atlanta, GA.9 Coca-Cola Company, as an 
artificial person, can nevertheless buy real property in Atlanta;10 
possessing this right through legal personhood. Originally, 
corporate personhood granted an exclusivity right to the 
corporation, where such corporation may have a monopoly over its 
area of business.11 However, these monopolistic privileges have 
since ended.12 Instead, states have created general laws that allow 
greater ease in forming a corporation or other artificial persons, 
such as a limited liability company.13 
Even with this expansion of artificial personhood,14 real 
property still holds a special role in society for natural persons. 
Sections A and B of this Part provide a basic overview of this 
special role through the lens of legal theory and principles, 
respectively. 
 
A.  The Moral Theory of Real Property  
 
Real property law is not simply about ownership. Theories of 
morality have contributed to this field of law.15 The traditional 
view of property rights is that “they promote and protect the self-
respect and autonomy for individuals within given societies.”16 
                                                                                                             
AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 27 (Roland Gray & Phillip Thomas eds., 1997) 
(stating that “person” usually means a human being, “but the technical legal 
meaning of a ‘person’ is a subject of legal rights and duties”). 
9 See generally GA. CODE ANN. § 44. 
10 While zoning laws may limit property ownership, this Article focuses on 
the ability to buy real property and not limitations of zoning laws. See, e.g., GA. 
CODE ANN. § 36-66. 
11 1 JEROME KAPLAN, GEORGIA CORPORATIONS, LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS 
& LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES § 2:2 (2015–2016). 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 The notion of artificial personhood existed prior to Christopher Columbus 
discovering the Americas. Id. 
15 For example, confiscating property during wartime violates moral theory. 
See Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199, 255 (1796) (declaring confiscation of property 
in time of war to be incompatible with “principles of justice,” “the dictates of 
the moral sense,” and “of right reason and natural equity”). 
16 Larry May, Corporate Property Rights, 5 J. OF BUS. ETHICS 225, 225 
(1986). 
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They are not simply about excluding others, but rather are “the 
legal framework of a free and democratic society that treats each 
person with equal concern and respect.”17 This ideology of equality 
and respect creates a human component to real property theory.18 
Because of this link between property ownership and morality, 
scholars have argued as to whether corporations deserve property 
rights.19 An important aspect of this argument is whether a 
corporation is moral.20 The issue of binding morality to 
corporations is an ongoing debate.21 The rise of corporate social 
responsibility suggests that corporations are moral, but that these 
notions of morality are newer concepts and remain only a means to 
                                                                                                             
17 Joseph William Singer, Property as the Law of Democracy, 63 DUKE L.J. 
1287, 1301 (2014). Other property rights did not have that same legal 
background that concerned itself with these grander ideas of democracy and 
equality. 
18 Because corporations are more tangentially connected to humans, 
scholars argue against their increased property rights. See May, supra note 16, at 
231 (“I would propose that we demote the status of corporate property rights in 
our society, making the list of possible restrictions on corporate property reflect 
the fact that this form of property does not have the moral support traditionally 
believed to be true of other property claims. Such a change in legal theory would 
not take much effort, especially after the fiction of the corporate ‘person’ was 
dispensed with.”). 
19 See id. 
20 See Susanna Kim Ripken, Corporations are People Too: A Multi-
Dimensional Approach to the Corporate Personhood Puzzle, 15 FORDHAM J. 
CORP. & FIN. L. 97, 118–31 (2009) (explaining the arguments for and against 
the idea of corporate moral personhood). 
21 Some philosophers argue that because a corporation lacks the capacity to 
feel emotion as a human, it cannot be moral. Id. at 121–25. However, according 
to philosopher Peter French, corporations possess morality due to intentionality. 
Id. at 127 (“Philosopher Peter French believes it is a corporation’s intentionality 
that gives it the status of a moral person because intentionality is both a 
necessary and sufficient condition for moral personhood.”). While an intentional 
stance can be important to understand morality, such an approach does not 
adequately address moral theory in connection to real property. Further, 
opposing philosophers to this intentionality stance argue that “intentionality is 
only a necessary, not a sufficient, condition for moral personhood. The essential 
component of moral responsibility that corporations lack is the capacity to feel 
emotion.” Id. at 121. The AI would not feel emotion, so it would not be moral 
under this theory. 
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increase profitability.22 The moral tradition of real property has 
always focused on the self-respect given to natural persons. 
Because of the innately human element of self-respect attached to 
property rights, the law protects such rights vigorously.23 
 
B.  Principles of Property Ownership 
 
Although property rights are often described as a “bundle of 
rights or things” bestowed to persons,24 this definition simplifies 
the significance that humans attach to such rights. Instead, the 
principles ascribed to real property law reflect the respect that 
society places on it, and as such, extending these rights requires 
serious deliberation. These principles arose from the common law, 
the Constitution, and legislation. 
Common law principles provide property owners with rights 
and obligations.25 One important right for a property owner is the 
right to exclude anyone from entering his property.26 A property 
owner also has certain obligations that make him liable under the 
law.27 Even with these rights and obligations, the common law 
                                                                                                             
22 See Dylan Minor & John Morgan, CSR as Reputation Insurance: Primum 
Non Nocere, 53 CAL. MGMT. REV. 40, 40 (2011) (“For many firms, the most 
precious asset lies not on the balance sheet, nor in the human capital of the 
workforce, but rather in its reputation. For instance, IBM’s reputation for being 
an enterprise-friendly and efficient solutions provider has enabled it to beat 
rivals for business over many years. McDonald’s reputation for being a family-
friendly and economical place to eat has sustained its market share in the face of 
fierce competition from other chains. However, reputation can be a fragile thing. 
Consider British Petroleum (BP) and its recent oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. 
While BP had for years invested in its sunburst logo and various ‘do good’ and 
‘be green’ campaigns, its reputation quickly slipped away in the midst of 
tragedy: its firm value was decimated by some $100 billion.”). 
23 See infra Part I.B. 
24 Singer, supra note 17, at 1288–90. 
25 Id. at 1323; see also Javins v. First Nat’l Realty, 428 F.2d 1071, 1077 
(D.C. Cir. 1970) (“In our judgment the common law itself must recognize the 
landlord’s obligation to keep his premises in a habitable condition.”). 
26 Singer, supra note 17, at 1294–95 (“We divide the world into things and 
then allocate those things among owners, giving them the power to exclude 
others from things they own as well as general powers to use them and transfer 
them.”). 
27 May, supra note 16, at 255 (“The Right-holder is entitled to exclude other 
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originally had a laissez-faire approach to property ownership. For 
the common law tradition, property ownership represented a 
significant right with fundamental values attached to it.28 These 
common law principles held true even through several revolutions, 
and transitioned and expanded under the U.S. Constitution. 
Constitutional principles increased natural persons’ rights. In 
the face of British tyranny, the United States Constitution stated 
“that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their 
Creator with certain unalienable Rights which among these are 
Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness.”29 These constitutional 
principles do not just control human interaction, but also how those 
interactions occur—including the importance of scarcity of 
resources in real property.30 The Fifth Amendment expressly 
prohibits the taking of private property, without just 
compensation.31 Because of this relationship, property law should 
reflect our deepest values as espoused in the Constitution.32 As 
stated previously, the liberal tradition of moral theory views real 
property as a means to promote self-respect for individuals.33 
Later congressional acts further sought to guard natural persons 
and promote moral theory. The Civil Rights Act of 1866 
guaranteed all citizens equal rights to real and personal property.34 
The Public Accommodations Law of 1964 ensured that, regardless 
of race, everyone had equal access to certain public 
accommodations.35 The Fair Housing Act of 1968 forbade sellers 
or renters from refusing a dwelling to any person based on race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin.36 Additionally, state laws 
                                                                                                             
members of the society from the property and the society is entitled to be 
excluded from liability.”). 
28 See Singer, supra note 17, at 1312. 
29 U.S. CONST. art. I § 9, cl. 8. 
30 Singer, supra note 17, at 1299. 
31 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
32 See Singer, supra note 17, at 1299 (“Property is not just about 
information or complexity; it is about promoting ‘Life, Liberty and the Pursuit 
of Happiness.’”). 
33 See supra notes 15–16 and accompanying text. 
34 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981 (West 1991). 
35 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a (West 1964). 
36 See generally Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C.A. § 3601. 
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protect tenants from eviction, unless the landlord shows legitimate 
cause.37 
These common law, constitutional, and legislative principles 
sought to protect natural persons’ real property. However, these 
principles do not simply protect real property because of its 
scarcity. Although the scarcity and power of exclusivity are vital 
aspects of real property law, these principles focus on self-respect 
for individuals.38 In fact, American law continues to encourage 
these principles.39 Because of the moral principles tied to real 
property ownership, this right must be carefully scrutinized before 
it is extended to autonomous artificial intelligent entities like Clive. 
For, in receiving the right to own real property, Clive would also 
receive the right of exclusivity on a scarce resource that has 
historic notions of human self-respect. 
 
II. OWNERSHIP SCENARIOS FOR AI ROBOTS 
 
The following three hypotheticals explore potential scenarios 
through which Clive may involve himself in real property 
ownership. The first hypothetical determines whether a potential 
issue arises from Clive facilitating a property transaction as an 
agent. This Section contends that robots are already acting as 
agents under current agency law. The second hypothetical 
addresses the possibility of Clive acquiring property rights like a 
corporation. Although differences exist between Clive and a 
                                                                                                             
37 See, e.g., Mark S. Dennison, Tenant’s Rights and Remedies Against 
Retaliatory Eviction by Landlord, 45 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D 375 (1998) 
(“[M]any states have adopted landlord-tenant and ‘anti-eviction’ or ‘anti-
reprisal’ statutes, with provisions that are specifically designed to protect 
residential tenants from retaliatory eviction by landlords.”). 
38 See supra notes 25–36 and accompanying text. 
39 See, e.g., tax laws encourage home ownership through beneficial 
deductions. See I.R.S., Tax Information for Homeowners, PUBLICATION 530 
(Jan. 12, 2006), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p530.pdf; see also Press 
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., America’s Homeownership Rate 
Rises to 66.7 Percent Including Record Numbers of Black and Hispanic 
Families (Apr. 21, 1999), http://archives.hud.gov/news/1999/pr99-69.html 
(“[Homeowners] tend to be more involved in promoting strong neighborhoods 
and good schools than renters.”). 
9
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corporation, this Article concludes that Clive should receive this 
type of property right—one with human oversight. The third 
hypothetical evaluates the possibility of Clive owning property like 
a natural person. In this situation, problems arise that, at least 
currently, should prevent this method of ownership. As such, this 
Article argues that courts should not grant real property rights like 
a natural person to Clive because this presents a fundamental shift 
that undermines the moral traditions tied to real property. 
 
A.  Facilitating Property Ownership as an Agent 
 
Presume that Clive works for a real estate employer.40 Clive 
may have an actual robot body and escort potential buyers to 
homes; Clive may be software that conducts deals on behalf of his 
employer. In either situation, he is not buying property for himself. 
Instead, he is acting as a real estate agent for his employer. 
Therefore, agency law governs Clive’s relationship. 
The Restatement of Agency § 3.05 provides that “[a]ny person 
may ordinarily be empowered to act so as to affect the legal 
relations of another. The actor’s capacity governs the extent to 
which, by so acting, the actor becomes subject to duties and 
liabilities to the person whose legal relations are affected or to 
third parties.”41 This definition provides that any person can be an 
agent, and the capacity of his legal scope determines the potential 
duties and liabilities to the principal and third parties.42 Under this 
definition, however, Clive could not act as an agent to his 
employer because he is not a “person” under the definition of 
agency law.43 
                                                                                                             
40 This real estate employer could be a natural person or an artificial person, 
like the corporation Century 21. 
41 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.05 (2006). 
42 See id. 
43 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.04(5) (“A person is (a) an 
individual; (b) an organization or association that has legal capacity to possess 
rights and incur obligations; (c) a government, political subdivision, or 
instrumentality or entity created by government; or (d) any other entity that has 
legal capacity to possess rights and incur obligations.”). Clive has yet to meet 
any of these definitions, unlike a corporation, which is a legal entity created by 
the government. 
10
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Another issue with this definition involves scope of 
employment. As stated above, a principal is liable for an agent so 
long as the agent adheres to its scope of employment.44 The 
Restatement describes software as mere tools that cannot work as 
agents.45 However, the Restatement’s classification of robots does 
not take into account the situations in which robots are already 
acting in the capacity of an agent.46 
In both case law and the real world, weak artificial intelligent 
robots (i.e. no cognitive states, just tools) have already acted as 
agents for their principals. In the two cases State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Company v. Bockhorst47 and McEvans v. 
Citibank, N.A.,48 the courts found that the respective companies 
were liable to a third party for errors caused by their robotic 
programs.49 In State Farm, the defendant, an insurance company, 
had a computer that reinstated plaintiff’s insurance policy 
retroactively.50 The court recognized that this was a computer 
mistake, and human oversight erred by not finding it.51 This 
computer error led to the plaintiff receiving a notice of renewal.52 
Under the theory of apparent authority,53 the plaintiff received the 
                                                                                                             
44 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.05. 
45 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY§ 1.04(5) cmt. e (“[A] computer 
program is not capable of acting as a principal or an agent as defined by the 
common law. At present, computer programs are instrumentalities of the persons 
who use them. If a program malfunctions, even in ways unanticipated by its 
designer or user, the legal consequences for the person who uses it are no 
different than the consequences stemming from the malfunction of any other 
type of instrumentality. That a program may malfunction does not create 
capacity to act as a principal or an agent.”). 
46 See infra notes 47–65 and accompanying text; see also Anthony J. Bella 
Jr., Contracting with Electronic Agents, 50 EMORY L.J. 1047, 1047 (2001) 
(“The use of computer technology to “make contracts” for humans is no longer 
mere prospect but reality. Technology has developed that enables individuals to 
use electronic agents to arrange exchanges without direct human intervention.”). 
47 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Bockhorst, 453 F.2d 533 (10th Cir. 1972). 
48 McEvans v. Citibank, N.A., 408 N.Y.S.2d 870 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1978). 
49 See State Farm, 453 F.2d 533; McEvans, 408 N.Y.S.2d 870. 
50 State Farm, 453 F.2d at 535. 
51 Id. at 535–36. 
52 Id. at 535. 
53 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.03 (2006) (“Apparent authority 
is the power held by an agent or other actor to affect a principal’s legal relations 
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notice of renewal, so it was reasonable for him to believe that the 
defendant reinstated his policy.54 While the defendant argued that 
this computer error should not bind it, the Tenth Circuit held 
otherwise.55 The court found that even though “the actual 
processing of the policy was carried out by an unimaginative 
mechanical device” the defendant was still liable for the plaintiff’s 
policy.56 In this situation, the computer served as an agent for the 
defendant.57 
Similarly, in McEvans, the court found that the defendant’s 
ATM machine created a bailment relationship with a customer 
who deposited money in its ATM.58 This relationship ensured that 
the defendant, a bank, would safeguard the customer’s funds.59 
Because the defendant was unable to verify the steps of the 
transaction between the ATM and customer, the defendant was 
liable for the customer’s lost funds.60 While an ATM machine is 
not advanced technology, it was able to act as an agent to the 
defendant—it had the authority to receive money from third parties 
on behalf of its employer, so the court found the principal, the 
defendant, liable for the error.61 
Although these cases involved rudimentary robotic tools 
working for their companies and neither court classified them as 
“agents,” these cases establish a framework for the future. The 
courts could have found no liability for the defendants because no 
human-agent caused the mistake, but instead, the courts found that 
an error by a robotic tool creates liability for the principal. With 
breakthroughs in artificial intelligence, this case law already 
establishes that robots can create duties and liabilities between its 
                                                                                                             
with third parties when a third party reasonably believes the actor has authority 
to act on behalf of the principal and that belief is traceable to the principal’s 
manifestations.”) (emphasis added). 
54 See State Farm, 453 F.2d at 536. 
55 Id. at 537. 
56 Id. 
57 See id. at 537. 
58 McEvans v. Citibank, N.A., 408 N.Y.S.2d 870, 872–73 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 
1978). 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 See id. 
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employer and a third party, which is the quintessential role of an 
agent. 
Besides these two cases, robots currently work as agents for 
principals in numerous industries, including as robo-bosses of 
human employees,62 robo-guards in prisons,63 and robo-traders on 
the stock market.64 Therefore, while the Restatement of Agency 
could ostensibly forbid Clive from facilitating property ownership 
as an agent, case law and current employment scenarios suggest 
otherwise. This trend of robotic agents is likely to increase as 
robots become more sophisticated,65 so Clive could legally fit into 
this category of robotic agents. The Restatement of Agency simply 
needs to update its definition of “person” to conform to modern 
society. 
Even with these above examples, these robots are simple 
software that may not compare to a strong66 AI like Clive, who 
could work outside his scope of employment. After all, Clive has a 
mind of his own. If he determined to act outside his employment, 
                                                                                                             
62 Glenn McDonald, Meet the New Boss: The World’s First Artificial-
Intelligence Manager, YAHOO (Sept. 9, 2015), https://www.yahoo.com/ 
tech/meet-the-new-boss-the-worlds-first-128660465704.html (This “AI system 
isn’t just automating routine tasks. It’s actually adjusting work orders on the 
fly, basing its decisions on enormous, cumulonimbus swirls of Big Data 
stored up the Cloud.”). 
63 James Trew, Robo-Guard the South Korean Correction Service Robot 
Says ‘Stay Out of Trouble’ (Video), ENGADGET (Apr. 15, 2012), 
http://www.engadget.com/2012/04/15/robo-guard-south-korean-robotic-guard/. 
64 Rob Langston, Trading in the 21st Century, RACONTEUR (Nov. 16, 2014), 
http://raconteur.net/finance/trading-in-the-21st-century. These Robo-traders 
quick transactions are often referred to as “High Frequency Trading.” 
65 See Tom Allen & Robin Widdison, Can Computers Make Contracts?, 9 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 25, 27 (1996) (“If autonomous computers are able to learn 
and modify their own behavior in this way, a reasonable implication must be 
that they are capable of manifesting (or, at least, appearing to manifest) human 
cognitive processes that are associated with the exercise of free will. These 
processes include making choices, forming intentions, reaching decisions, and 
giving or withholding consent. What follows from these AI-orientated 
developments? Humans can give their computers substantial autonomy in 
decision-making, thus permitting the machines to complete highly complex 
tasks which involve not only the need for speed of operation but also 
sophisticated, precise judgments.”). 
66 See supra note 3. 
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who should be liable? Current agency laws, however, can solve 
this problem. If a third party reasonably believed that Clive acted 
on behalf of his principal and that belief is traceable to the 
principal’s manifestations, then such a principal could be held 
liable67 under the same principles as McEvans and State Farm. If 
no actual or apparent authority can be linked to the principal, then 
the third party can sue Clive. The nature of the relationship that 
exists between Clive and his principal determines the type of 
compensation.68 
Even with this concern over scope of employment, courts 
should find it relatively easy to treat Clive as an agent to his real 
estate principal. Clive does not own the real property, but is merely 
assisting in a transaction. In this case, Clive is working for a 
company, similar to robots already working in other fields.69 
With issues over an AI working as an agent discussed, Section 
B evaluates the possibility of Clive owning real property like a 
corporation. 
 
                                                                                                             
67 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.03 (2006). 
68 Several articles have explored possible legal remedies for artificial 
intelligence. See Curtis E.A. Karnow, Liability for Distributed Artificial 
Intelligences, 11 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 147 (1996); see also David C. Vladeck, 
Machines Without Principals: Liability Rules and Artificial Intelligence, 89 
WASH. L. REV. 117 (2014); Solum, supra note 2, at 1245 (“If the AI could 
insure, at a reasonable cost, against the risk that it would be found liable for 
breaching the duty to exercise reasonable care, then functionally the AI would 
be able to assume both the duty and the corresponding liability.”). Recently, the 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (“NHTSA”) has determined 
that “it is more reasonable to identify the driver [of Google’s driverless cars] as 
whatever (as opposed to whoever) is doing the driving. In this instance, an item 
of motor vehicle equipment, the SDS [self-driving system], is actually driving 
the vehicle.” Letter from Paul A Hemmersbaugh, Chief Counsel, NHTSA, to 
Chris Urmson, Director, Google, Inc., (Feb. 4, 2016), available at 
http://isearch.nhtsa.gov/files/Google%20--%20compiled%20response%20to% 
2012%20Nov%20%2015%20interp%20request%20--%204%20Feb%2016% 
20final.htm (explaining how Google should interpret certain provision as it 
applies to it self-driving vehicles). This issue of driverless cars will become a 
major legal battle for smart robots of the future to determine who or what should 
be liable for damages. 
69 See supra notes 62–64 and accompanying text. 
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B.  Owning Property Like a Corporation 
 
In this second hypothetical, Clive owns property similar to a 
corporation. Before comparing Clive to a corporate person, it is 
important to determine what that means. Corporations are artificial 
persons created by the government.70 As such, they have certain 
common traits. The seven common attributes of a corporation are 
as follows: (1) it is a legal entity separate and apart from its 
shareholders; (2) it has the capacity of continued existence 
independent of the lifetime or personnel of its shareholders; (3) it 
has the capacity to contract; (4) it has the capacity to own property 
in its own name; (5) it has the capacity to commit torts; (6) it has 
the capacity to commit crimes, but only such crimes where 
criminal intent is not a necessary element of the crime; and (7) it 
has the capacity to sue and be sued.71 
Clive could meet all seven of these corporate attributes. First, 
Clive would be a legal entity that owns property for the benefit of 
his shareholders. Second, Clive is a robot, so he continues to exist 
independent of his shareholder’s lifetime. Third, Clive has the 
mental capabilities to sign contracts. Fourth, Clive should be able 
to sign property in his name because he is acting in the same 
capacity as a corporation. Fifth and sixth, given his mental 
capacity, Clive could commit torts and crimes, whether by his own 
actions or his agents. Seventh, Clive would be able to sue or be 
sued to protect his property. 
For example, if Clive existed to find dilapidated homes and flip 
them for a profit, he would exist like a corporation. Clive would 
continue to exist independent of his shareholders, but his goal 
would be to increase their wealth. Presuming that he has 
shareholders to provide him with money to invest, Clive could 
independently seek out undervalued properties, sign contracts to 
purchase the homes, and repair them for resale. If debris hits a 
passerby as Clive is repairing a home, then the passerby could sue 
Clive for his injuries. Thus, Clive works like a business to benefit 
his shareholders. 
                                                                                                             
70 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.04(5) (2006). 
71 KAPLAN, supra note 11, at § 2:6. 
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As such, the government should grant Clive artificial 
personhood,72 giving him the right to own property in a manner 
similar to a corporation. As the de facto CEO, Clive would manage 
his own wealth-generating entity, which could range anywhere 
from the structure of a regular corporation and a home flipper to a 
robot that generates innovative ways to profit through property 
ownership. Under this definition of personhood, however, Clive 
would own property to increase the wealth of his shareholders and 
must report to a board of directors. This human guardianship—like 
the structure currently in place for managers of corporations73—
would allow dual oversight by both the shareholders and the board. 
Further, corporations do not have the same moral theory tied to 
property rights,74 which can be seen in the limited nexus between 
the corporate assets and the shareholders.75 By comparison, Clive 
may even run more smoothly than a corporation managed by 
humans.76 With advanced cognitive capabilities, Clive could 
multitask to a much greater degree, increasing accountability and 
efficiency.77 However, human oversight is still required for 
corporate property owners. 
While real property may be held in a corporation’s name, “the 
corporation can be properly said to act only where there is a causal 
nexus of actions from stockholders or board members to managers 
of employees. The corporation itself does not properly act at all,” 
                                                                                                             
72 The issue of legal personhood for AI robots has been addressed by 
several articles. Solum, supra note 2, at 1231 (addressing the arguments against 
providing artificial intelligence with personhood status); F. Patrick Hubbard, 
“Do Androids Dream?” Personhood and Intelligent Artifacts, 83 TEMP. L. 
REV. 405 (2011) (arguing that artificial intelligent entities should be granted 
legal personhood if they have certain cognitive abilities as well as assessing 
theories of personhood for artificial intelligence). 
73 Managers report to their board of directors and also have duties to their 
shareholders. 
74 See May, supra note 16 (“Corporate property rights present an interesting 
challenge to the liberal conceptions of property rights, for it is unclear the self-
respect of individuals is promoted by the existence of a system of property rights 
for corporations.”). 
75 Id. at 226. 
76 See, e.g., McDonald, supra note 62. 
77 See McDonald, supra note 62. 
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but instead requires action from its human employees.78 Similarly, 
Clive would be a legal person who nevertheless still requires the 
human element. If a person wishes to sue corporate Clive, he may 
sue the corporate AI or pierce the corporate veil. If the board of 
directors allows Clive to run rampant without the proper 
supervision, then a plaintiff may have better odds of piercing the 
corporate veil.79 This limitation ensures that Clive’s board of 
directors will not give him unlimited authority. Clive’s success 
benefits the shareholders, which adheres closer to a moral theory 
of benefiting individuals,80 and oversight limits foreseeable (and 
unforeseeable) catastrophes.81 
Without human oversight, however, Clive would own property 
like a human. Section C explains issues with this approach, and 
ultimately concludes that courts should not make this leap. 
 
C.  Owning Property Like a Human 
 
In this third hypothetical, Clive may buy as much property as 
he can afford, like any natural person. He has the rights to the 
property, and as such, only he can face legal repercussions.82 Three 
                                                                                                             
78 May, supra note 16, at 227. 
79 Piercing the corporate veil seeks to impose “personal liability on 
otherwise immune corporate officers, directors, or shareholders for the 
corporation’s wrongful acts.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
80 See May, supra note 16, at 226 (“If corporate property rights could be so 
easily reduced to individual property claims of stockholders, then there is no 
special problems in moral theory or legal theory posed by corporate property 
rights.”). 
81 Because of the speed and processing power of Clive, an error in his brain 
(i.e. algorithm) can cause instantaneously devastating results. See, e.g., Gregory 
Scopino¸ Do Automated Trading Systems Dream of Manipulating the Price of 
Future Contracts? Policing Markets For Improper Trading Practices by 
Algorithmic Robots, 67 FLA. L. REV. 221 (2015); Nick Baumann, Too Fast to 
Fail: How High-Speed Trading Fuels Wall Street Disasters, MOTHER JONES 
(Jan./Feb. 2013), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/02/high-frequency-
trading-danger-risk-wall-street (discussing high frequency trading in the 2010 
flash crash and warning how these advanced algorithms can cause a financial 
meltdown). 
82 Articles have addressed potential liability systems for Clive. See Karnow, 
supra note 68; see also Vladeck, supra note 68; Gabriel Hallevy, “I Robot—I, 
Criminal”—When Science Fiction Becomes Reality: Legal Liability of AI 
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primary reasons exist to suggest that Clive should be granted rights 
to own property like a natural person. However, such reasons fail 
to recognize the paradigm shift that Clive presents to real property 
ownership. 
The first argument is that mentally incompetent natural persons 
cannot own real property outright because of their cognitive 
issues.83 Clive has cognitive abilities that are far beyond the 
minimum mental requirements. Because this cognitive ability is an 
essential part of owning real property, Clive’s rights should not be 
limited. However, real property ownership is not simply about 
mental abilities.84 A thirteen-year-old boy with Albert Einstein’s 
IQ cannot own property without a legal guardian. On the 
situation’s face, this boy should be granted these rights. Moreover, 
the fears of unpredictable consequences are minimal compared to 
granting Clive full ownership.85 However, the law has determined 
that this boy cannot own property without legal guardianship. 
Although mental capacity is a major component to ownership, it is 
not the single deciding factor. 
The second argument proffers since corporations can own real 
property, Clive should have this right as well. Humans are 
involved in corporations, but the corporation still owns the 
property in its name.86 Additionally, many corporations are run 
                                                                                                             
Robots Committing Criminal Offenses, 22 SYRACUSE J. SCI. & TECH. L. 1, 
(2010). 
83 See Lawrence Frolik, Legal Implications of Mental Incapacity: 
Guardianship & Conservatorship, SL071 ALI-ABA 67, 73–75 (2006); see also 
W.J. Dunn, Legal Implications of Mental Incapacity: Guardianship & 
Conservatorship, 9 A.L.R.3d 774 (1966). 
84 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 14 (1981); see also GA. 
CODE ANN. § 44-5-119 (1990). 
85 The risks caused by robots are much more significant than that of a 
thirteen-year old boy. See, e.g., Elvis Picardo, Four Big Risks of Algorithmic 
High-Frequency Trading, INVESTOPEDIA (Jan. 27, 2016, 2:13 PM), 
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/markets/012716/four-big-risks-
algorithmic-highfrequency-trading.asp (“Algorithmic HFT [i.e. robo-traders] has 
a number of risks, the biggest of which is its potential to amplify systemic risk. 
Its propensity to intensify market volatility can ripple across to other markets 
and stoke investor uncertainty. Repeated bouts of unusual market volatility 
could wind up eroding many investors’ confidence in market integrity.”). 
86 See Barbara J. Van Arsdale, et al.,  18A AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 
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largely by robotic software without human intervention, so the 
difference is minimal.87 
The third argument hinges on the idea that Clive will still have 
oversight even if he owns property like a natural person. The 
government oversees all property and has the ability to seize any 
property as long as certain factors are met.88 The Constitution only 
prohibits seizing property without just compensation,89 so Clive 
can be compensated. In addition, the government seizes property to 
prevent dangerous conditions,90 so Clive’s property could be 
seized if a danger emerged. This argument, however, creates a 
blanket statement of the government’s “takings” power. This is not 
true because the “takings” power is illegal unless the government 
can assert direct harm.91 
More importantly, the second and third arguments for granting 
Clive the right to own real property discount the principles of real 
property and ignore how this change represents a fundamental 
paradigm shift. As discussed, real property has a moral theory 
attached that promotes self-respect for people.92 Principles 
espoused under the common law, the Constitution, and subsequent 
legislation have contributed to advancing natural persons’ rights.93 
This idea does not extend to artificial persons and has led to 
                                                                                                             
624 (2016) (“Concentration of stock ownership does not alter the fact that title 
to the corporate property is vested in the corporation and not in the owner of the 
corporate stock, and even the fact that an individual owns all the stock of a 
corporation does not make him or her the owner of its property.”). 
87 See, e.g., Hayley Peterson, Wal-Mart has an Army of Robots That Pick 
and Pack Your Holiday Gifts, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 13, 2013), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/wal-mart-warehouse-robots-2013-12; Meet the 
Robots Shipping Your Amazon Orders, TIME (Dec. 1, 2014), 
http://time.com/3605924/amazon-robots/; See also McDonald, supra note 62. 
88 See Penn Cent. Transp. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104 (1978); see also 
Robert Meltz, Takings Law Today: A Primer for the Perplexed, 34 ECOLOGY 
L.Q. 307 (2007). 
89 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
90 See Meltz, supra note 88, at 321. 
91 See id. (“A taking claim can succeed only when the adverse impact on the 
property was caused directly by the challenged government conduct. Indirect, or 
“consequential,” injuries are without Takings Clause remedy.”). 
92 See supra Part I.A. 
93 See supra Part I.B. 
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increased pushback against the idea of granting them the same 
rights.94 
As such, granting Clive this right would be a major shift in the 
law. While corporations have a history of property ownership, 
Clive would be the first of his kind. Although corporations have 
developed into sophisticated artificial persons with increased rights 
and power, the human element of a corporation remains a 
significant distinction from Clive. Robots were initially viewed as 
tools for humans. Thus, drafters of the law never considered 
providing robots with the bundle of rights associated with property 
ownership. It would be difficult to predict the changes in artificial 
intelligence that will lead to Clive and how the law will cope with 
such novel issues. However, because of the principles of real 
property and the paradigm shift that Clive creates in the law, courts 
should not distort the law in this situation. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Real property rights promote and protect self-respect for 
individuals. This fundamental function separates it from other 
types of property. Allowing Clive and other AI robots to own real 
property would require that courts interpret laws in a context 
Congress could never have imagined. Such a constructive 
interpretation would force courts to overextend judicial discretion 
and look far beyond the intent of the law. As such, Congress 
should have exclusive authority. 
These unintended consequences are even noticeable from the 
legal creation of corporations. Corporations, as persons, gained 
significant—and likely unforeseeable—rights.95 However, 
                                                                                                             
94 See May, supra note 16, at 231 (“I would propose that we demote the 
status of corporate property rights in our society, making the list of possible 
restrictions on corporate property reflect the fact that this form of property does 
not have the moral support traditionally believed to be true of other property 
claims. Such a change in legal theory would not take much effort, especially 
after the fiction of the corporate ‘person’ was dispensed with.”). 
95 In the early 1800s, the Court found that corporations had the ability to 
enter into contracts. See Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 
(1819). Corporations’ rights have only expanded. Now, corporations have 
certain campaigning rights for elections, with legal theorists pondering the 
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corporate persons remain limited by human oversight and 
controlled by humans, their shareholders, and board of directors. 
Even with this oversight, significant pushback already exists 
concerning their increased powers.96 Several scholars have 
questioned this empowering legal fiction and its potential 
                                                                                                             
identity of a corporate person. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); 
Susanna Kim Ripken, Corporations are People Too: A Multi-Dimensional 
Approach to the Corporate Personhood Puzzle, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. 
L. 97 (2009). At this point, limitations seem few and far between, such as a 
corporate person cannot vote in an election or marry a natural person. See 
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 394 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part) (“Although they make enormous contributions to our society, 
corporations are not actually members of it. They cannot vote or run for office. 
Because they may be managed and controlled by nonresidents, their interests 
may conflict in fundamental respects with the interests of eligible voters. The 
financial resources, legal structure, and instrumental orientation of corporations 
raise legitimate concerns about their role in the electoral process.”); Catherine 
Traywick, Hey, They’re People Too: Seattle Woman Weds Corporation, TIME 
(July 24, 2012), http://newsfeed.time.com/2012/07/24/hey-theyre-people-too-
seattle-woman-weds-corporation/ (stating that a woman’s marriage license to a 
corporation was voided because the corporation was only 1.5 months old and 
was not capable of consent). However, the two reasons given that the 
corporation could not marry—too young and cannot consent—are extremely 
weak since many corporations are of age and if a corporation can consent to a 
contract, then why can it not consent to a marriage? While this marriage was a 
ruse, it exposed the ridiculousness of the law. See also Carl J. Mayer, 
Personalizing the Impersonal: Corporations and the Bill of Rights, 41 
HASTINGS L.J. 577, 664–67 (1990) (providing an appendix with the Bill of 
Rights and other constitutional principles granted to corporations through court 
decisions). 
96 See May, supra note 16. Even in the 18th century, America’s founding 
fathers had concerns over corporations’ rights. See Letter from Thomas 
Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789) (opposing the continuation of 
contracts prior to the founding of the United States of America, explaining that 
“no society can make a perpetual constitution, or even a perpetual law. The earth 
belongs always to the living generation. They may manage it then, and what 
proceeds from it, as they please, during their usufruct. . . [but if person could] 
eat up the usufruct of the lands for several generations to come, and then the 
lands would belong to the dead, and not to the living, which would be reverse of 
our principle.”). Currently, corporations, which are headed by natural persons, at 
least “eat up” the estates. President Jefferson’s words ring even louder today 
when dealing with potential artificially intelligent life forms having the ability to 
perpetually “eat up” real property. 
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problems.97 Even so, the rights granted to corporations open the 
doors wide for artificial persons such as Clive to receive similar 
rights. It would be difficult for courts to find that Clive does not 
meet the legal criteria for corporate personhood.98 Therefore, 
similar to a corporation, Clive should be able to own real property 
with legal guardianship. This legal guardianship can come in the 
form of a board of directors, managers, shareholders, or all of the 
above. 
Courts accept that corporations can own property for the 
benefit of their natural persons. Without the shareholders or human 
managers, the corporation transforms its identity, a transformation 
that courts should construe to have legal limitations. Thus, Clive 
should be granted legal rights under hypotheticals one and two—
Clive should be able to work as an agent for a principal or act as 
the principal itself, like a corporation. 
 
PRACTICE POINTERS 
 
 Robots currently act as agents in various industries and 
courts can find a business liable for their actions, even 
without any actual contractual agreement by a human 
counterpart. 
 Courts have interpreted personhood loosely for artificially 
created business entities. 
 The rights attributed to artificial persons should guide 
future decisions of innovative smart technologies. 
                                                                                                             
97 See Mayer, supra note 95, at 650 (“Behind doctrines of commercial 
property and the free market of ideas is hidden the tacit acceptance of the 
corporation as a person, entitled to all the rights of real humans.”); see also 
David Fagundes, What We Talk About When We Talk About Persons: The 
Language of A Legal Fiction, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1745, 1750 (2001) (“That 
‘[the] corporation is a person’ remains one of the most enduring and problematic 
legal fictions”.); May, supra note 16, at 231; see also Citizens United, 558 U.S. 
at 394 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Under 
the majority’s view, I suppose it may be a First Amendment problem that 
corporations are not permitted to vote, given that voting is, among other things, 
a form of speech.”). 
98 See supra Part II.B. 
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